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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of ADR' is in constant flux. During this Survey period,2
arbitration witnessed several important developments. The United States
t Professor of Law in Residence and Director, ADR Program, Michigan State
University College of Law; B.A. 1971, Wayne State University; M.A. 1975, Wayne State
University; J.D. 1980, Michigan State University College of Law (formerly, Detroit
College of Law).
The author gratefully acknowledges the significant contributions of Brian Pappas,
M.P.P., J.D., L.L.M., Adjunct Professor of Law and Associate Director of the ADR
Program at Michigan State University College of Law, who prepared the legislative
update, Barbara Bean, J.D., M.S.L.S., for technical research assistance, and Brandon W.
Ehrie (J.D. candidate, May 2010), whose commitment to task and quality research is sui
generis.
1. Although the term ADR refers to many processes - negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, and various hybrids - this Survey article focuses on arbitration. Compulsory
arbitration of unresolved contract disputes in police and fire departments, subject to
Michigan Public Act 312, is outside the scope of coverage. Compulsory arbitration, in
contrast to voluntary arbitration, is a process of settling disputes between employer and
employee by a government agency. A decision-maker investigates the facts and makes an
award, which the parties must accept. There is no front-end choice whether to employ
arbitration. It is compelled by law.
2. The Survey period for this article covers United States Supreme Court, Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and Michigan Court of Appeals cases decided June 1, 2008
through May 31, 2009.
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Supreme Court decided three cases,3 a prolific number when compared to
recent years. In a long-awaited decision, 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett,4 the
Supreme Court revisited the question of whether statutory claims arising
under a collective bargaining agreement may be arbitrated if subject to a
union-negotiated waiver which is clear and unmistakable. The decision
tested the sustainability of Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama,' a case in which the Supreme Court held that section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) 6 is
more than jurisdictional, it authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law to enforce collective bargaining agreements, including
promises to arbitrate under such agreements. In 14 Penn Plaza, however,
the Supreme Court used the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), not the
LMRA, to decide the fundamental issue of collective waiver.8 According
to some commentators, the Supreme Court's decision to rely on the
FAA, an Act historically construed to exclude collective bargaining
agreements,9 may signal the court's willingness to unify arbitral
jurisprudence and bring labor law under the umbrella of the more
predictable statutory framework of the FAA.
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Michigan Court of Appeals also
decided cases that recast the law of arbitral jurisprudence. In one case,
the Michigan Court of Appeals considered the question of whether
parties under an unintended common law arbitration agreement may
authorize an arbitrator to issue an award involving quitclaim deeds, even
though the Michigan Arbitration Act (MAA) explicitly prohibits the
arbitration of real estate disputes.10 In deciding the case, the appellate
3. In a fourth case, Improv West Associates v. Comedy Club, Inc. 129 S. Ct. 45, 45
(2008), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 514
F.3d 833 (2007) and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its
decision in light of Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). See Mary A.
Bedikian, Alternative Dispute Resolution: 2009 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 21 (2009). Since Hall Street was decided, state supreme courts and the federal
circuits are split on whether the non-statutory "manifest disregard of the law" standard
can be invoked to vacate an arbitral award. See Sherry Hereford v. D.R. Horton, No.
1070396, 2008 WL 4097594 (Ala. Sept. 5, 2008) (holding that the "manifest disregard of
the law" standard is dead). But see Kashner Davidson Security Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d
68 (1st Cir. 2008).
4. 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1458 (2009).
5. 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
6. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (West 2010).
7. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-14 (West 2010).
8. 14 Penn. Plaza, 129 S.Ct. at 1469.
9. See infra note 44 for an explanation of the Supreme Court's bifurcated approach
in the area of collective bargaining agreements and statutory claims.
10. In re Nestorovski, 283 Mich. App. 177, 197-99, 769 N.W.2d 720, 733-34 (2009).
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court re-affirmed the mutual co-existence of common law and statutory
arbitration agreements, a phenomenon unique to Michigan." In other
developments, Michigan courts addressed a wide variety of issues
including subject-matter jurisdiction, waiver, access to arbitration,
judicial review, and interlocutory appeals.12 On the whole, the cases
analyzed in this Survey article reinforce the view that arbitration has cut a
wide swath across many substantive areas of law, and that state and
federal courts continue to respect, if not favor, arbitration as a viable
method of resolving conflict.
11. Id. at 200, 769 N.W.2d at 734.
12. In addition to the cases covered in this Survey article, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals also decided the following cases of note: Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v.
Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 471 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district
court's judgment in compelling arbitration between a United States non-profit
corporation and an Australian corporation engaged in creation science ministry, and in
declining to issue a foreign antisuit injunction to halt the Australian litigation; "[c]omity
dictates that [these injunctions] be issued sparingly and only in the rarest of cases"); Cook
v. All State Home Mortgage, Inc., 329 Fed. Appx. 584, 585 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the
district court's judgment in granting an employer's motion to dismiss and to compel
arbitration where an arbitration clause was embedded in an employment agreement,
however, no award of attorneys' fees and costs was supported where the plaintiff
employees elected not to subsequently arbitrate their dispute); Dealer Computer Servs.,
Inc. v. Fox Valley Ford, 310 Fed. Appx. 749, 750 (6th Cir. 2009) (vacating the district
court's judgment upholding an American Arbitration Association panel's ruling that
distinct arbitration clauses in various contracts between seller and buyers did not preclude
class arbitration; the ruling did not speak to whether buyers actually satisfied class
requirements, thus the award was not ripe for judicial review); Ganim v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 574 F.3d 305, 305 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court's judgment that
Columbia properly refused to defend Ganim in arbitration because the allegations against
Ganim did not state a claim potentially within the scope of the policy's coverage);
Mazera v. Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 565 F.3d 997, 999, 1002 (6th Cir. 2009)
(affirming the district court's judgment upholding the arbitration agreement, where
employee's assertions that he lacked bargaining power and did not understand English
well was insufficient to place in issue the making of the arbitration agreement, and the
arbitration agreement was supported by consideration, but reversing the portion of the
district court's judgment with respect to the cost-splitting provision that required the
employee to pay a $500 deposit towards the arbitration); R.H. Cochran & Assocs., Inc. v.
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No 33, 335 Fed. Appx. 516, 517-18 (6th
Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court's judgment not to vacate an arbitral award since
the award did not offend any of the requirements of vacatur, and the arbitrator was
"arguably construing or applying the contract"); Quixtar, Inc. v. Brady, 328 Fed. Appx.
317, 321-22 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court's judgment in compelling
distributors to resume arbitration; this was a "final" order under the provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act and was not subject to further appeal).
2010] 87
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II. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
A. Statutory Claims Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
In 14 Penn Plaza3 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that
"clearly and unmistakably" required union members to arbitrate Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 14 claims was enforceable
under federal law.'5 The Supreme Court's affirmative response to this
question, decided within the statutory constructs of the FAA,16 may well
suggest a trend toward harmonizing federal labor law and bringing it
within the ambit of a statute that has long excluded collective bargaining
agreements from its scope."
Respondents were members of the Service Employees International
Union, Local 32BJ (Union).' 8 The union had a collective bargaining
agreement with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc.
(RAB), a multi-employer bargaining association for the New York City
real-estate industry.19 The collective bargaining agreement contained two
significant provisions - an anti-discrimination clause and a mandatory
grievance procedure. 20 The two clauses were linked into a single
provision and provided, in relevant part, as follows:
§30. No DISCRIMINATION There shall be no discrimination
against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed,
color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or
any other characteristic protected by law, including, but not
limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the
New York City Human Rights Code, . . . or any other similar
laws, rules or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the
13. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
14. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 421-634 (West 2010).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1462-63.
17. See Galanter and McLaughlin, Does the Supreme Court Decision in 14 Penn
Plaza Augur the Unification of the FAA and Labor Arbitration Law, DisP. RESOL. J.
May/July 2009 at 57 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza may
reflect the court's desire to "diminish the role of federal common law standards" and to
expand the role of the FAA, resulting in a more "coherent basis for judicial review of
labor arbitration proceedings and awards").
18. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1461.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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grievance and arbitration procedures (Articles V and VI) as the
sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall
apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims
of discrimination."21
14 Penn Plaza was a member of RAB.2 2 In August 2003, with
approval from the union, 14 Penn Plaza contacted an affiliate of Temco,
Spartan Security (also unionized) to provide licensed security guards to
staff the lobby of its building.23 As a result, respondents were reassigned
[from night lobby watchmen] to jobs as night porters and light duty
cleaners.24 Claiming that the reassignments resulted in emotional distress
and loss of income, respondents filed grievances in which they asserted
multiple contract violations. 2 5 First, the company violated the collective
bargaining agreement's ban on workplace discrimination by reassigning
job functions based on age.26 Second, the company violated seniority
rules by failing to promote one plaintiff to a handyman position.27 And
third, the company failed to equitably rotate overtime.28 When the
29
company denied the grievances, the union filed for arbitration. Shortly
afterwards, the union dropped the age discrimination claim.30 While the
balance of the case was pending in arbitration, respondents filed a
separate duty of fair representation (DFR) suit against the union, alleging
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by
withdrawing the age discrimination grievance before it could be heard in
arbitration.31 An arbitrator was appointed and heard evidence on the
transfer and overtime grievances; both grievances were denied in their
32
entirety.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1461-62.
24. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462. The union had consented to the security
personnel contract. Id. For this reason, the union did not believe it could legitimately
object to the personnel reassignments. Id.
31. Id. at 1463. This was a "hybrid" suit against the union and 14 Penn Plaza under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (West
2010), claiming that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that 14 Penn
Plaza breached the collective bargaining agreement by reassigning respondents. 14 Penn
Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1463. Respondents subsequently dismissed this suit, with prejudice.
Id.
32. Id. at 1462.
892010]
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Subsequently, respondents filed a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that the company had
violated their rights under ADEA. The EEOC issued a Dismissal and
Notice of Rights, stating that the agency's "review of the evidence . . .
fail[ed] to indicate that a violation ha[d] occurred."3 4 Respondents then
initiated suit in federal district court, asserting discrimination claims
under ADEA and state and local laws. Petitioners, 14 Penn Plaza, filed
a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to section 336 and section 437 of
the Federal Arbitration Act.3 8 Relying on Second Circuit precedent that
"even a clear and unmistakable union-negotiated waiver of a right to
litigate certain federal and state statutory claims in a judicial forum is
unenforceable," the district court denied petitioner's motion.3 9 Petitioners
appealed under section 16 of the FAA,4 0 but the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.4 1 According to the Second Circuit, petitioner's motion
33. Id.
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
35. Id.
36. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such
an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (West 2010).
37. Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides, in material part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 2010).
38. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
39. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., No. 04 Civ. 7536 (NRB), 2006 WL 1520517, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006).
40. Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes an interlocutory appeal of "an
order ... refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title" or "denying a petition
under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed." 9 U.S.C.A. § 16(a)(1)(A)-(B)
(West 2010).
41. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462. The Second Circuit relied on its earlier
decision in Rogers v. New York University, 220 F.3d 73, 75 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that
union-negotiated mandatory arbitration clauses which require arbitration of federal
statutory causes of action are unenforceable to the extent they waive the right of judicial
recourse).
90 [Vol. 56:85
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was barred by Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., which held that a union
could not prospectively waive workers' rights to a judicial forum "for
causes of action created by Congress."42 In recognizing the tension
between Gardner-Denver and the Supreme Court's more recent holding
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,43 the court of appeals
explained that unlike Gardner-Denver which involved a collective
environment, an individual employee is free to choose compulsory
arbitration." Although the Supreme Court had an earlier opportunity to
resolve the Gardner-Denver/Gilmer tension in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp.,45 it declined to do so, finding that the waiver at
issue in Wright was not "clear and unmistakable.A 6 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, to resolve the issue left open by Wright.47
42. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 92 (2007) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1974)).
43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
44. Pyett, 498 F.3d at 91-92. Since Gilmer, two distinct lines of Supreme Court
precedent exist. The first line traces back to Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36
(1974), and involves statutory causes of action under collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at 38. Suspicious of the ability of arbitrators to decide matters implicating protective
federal legislation, the Supreme Court concluded that the nature of the collective
bargaining relationship with focus on the "collective good" militated against the union's
ability to waive the statutory rights of its individual members. Id. at 55. The Supreme
Court's jurisprudence assumed a decisive shift with a second line of cases in the mid-
1980s, when the court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985), a case involving claims arising under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-7 (West 2010). After examining anew the feasibility of arbitration, the Supreme
Court observed, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral
rather than a judicial forum. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. Furthermore, "so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." Id. at
637. The Supreme Court's embrace of arbitration, once a hotbed of judicial hostility, was
more enduring than commentators expected. Six years later, in Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, the
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that discrimination claims under ADEA may be
submitted to compulsory arbitration. In a detailed opinion, the Supreme Court discussed
the salient features of arbitration, speed, quality of decision-making, ability to acquire
essential evidence, and finality. Id. at 30-32. The court concluded that even where
arbitration is mandated as a condition of employment, it is an appropriate forum,
provided nothing in the legislative history of the applicable federal [or state] statute
forecloses arbitration. Id. at 26-27. Although arbitration pundits believed that the
Supreme Court overruled Gardner-Denver in Gilmer, on closer review, the court's
decision in Gilmer merely solidified the dichotomy between discrimination claims arising
under collective bargaining agreements and individual discrimination claims, a
dichotomy which the court clarified but did not technically overrule in 14 Penn Plaza.
45. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). The Supreme Court decided in Wright that the waiver was
not "clear and unmistakable."
46. Id. at 81.
47. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1463.
912010]
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Speaking through Justice Thomas, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the holding of the Second Circuit.48 First, the court rejected
respondent's argument that the arbitration clause was outside the
permissible scope of the collective bargaining process because it
involved individual, non-economic, statutory rights.49 Invoking Wright,
Justice Thomas stated that "[n]othing in the law suggests a distinction
between the status of arbitration agreements signed by an individual
employee and those agreed to by a union representative."5 0 Wright only
requires that an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims
be explicitly stated.5 1 The Supreme Court determined that the collective
bargaining agreement at issue here met the "explicitly stated"
obligation.52
The Supreme Court also rejected respondent's second contention,
specifically that section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 barred
enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 54 Indeed, the court found that
section 118 endorsed the use of ADR, and nothing in the legislative
history suggested otherwise.55 "Moreover, reading the legislative history
in the manner suggested by respondents would create a direct conflict
with the statutory text, which encourages the use of arbitration for
dispute resolution without imposing any constraints on collective
bargaining. In such a contest, the text must prevail." 6 Here, under the
National Labor Relations Act, the union had the authority to negotiate on
behalf of its membership and to collectively bargain, an obligation the
union fulfilled when it bargained in good faith with RAB and agreed that
employment-related discrimination claims, including claims brought
under the ADEA, would be resolved in arbitration.57
Next, the Supreme Court examined the collective bargaining
agreement's mandatory arbitration provision in the context of Gardner-
Denver.5 Respondents argued that Gardner-Denver and its progeny
precluded a union from waiving an employee's right to a judicial forum
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1464.
50. Id. at 1465.
5 1. Id.
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. 102 - 166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991).
54. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1465. The court observed that "Section 118
expresses Congress' support for alternative dispute resolution: 'where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under' the ADEA." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1466.
58. Id.
92 [Vol. 56:85
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under federal antidiscrimination statutes because "allowing the union to
waive this right would substitute the union's interests for the employee's
antidiscrimination rights." 59 Essentially, the combination of union control
over [arbitration] and the inherent conflict of interest with respect to
discrimination claims . . . provided the foundations for the court's
holding [in Gardner-Denver] that arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements could not foreclose an individual employee's right to bring a
lawsuit in court to vindicate a statutory discrimination claim.60
Clarifying that the holding in Gardner-Denver was not as broad as
respondents suggested, the Supreme Court explained that the collective
bargaining agreement at issue in Gardner-Denver did not mandate
arbitration of statutory claims.6 ' The arbitrator ruled on the "unjust
termination" claim, but he did not address the claim of racial
discrimination which the employee had added at the final pre-arbitration
step.62 Although the arbitration was premised on the same underlying
facts as the Title VII claim, the Supreme Court held that "the federal
policy favoring arbitration does not establish that an arbitrator's
resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory claim under
Title VII."63 In this case, the collective bargaining agreement contained a
specific clause that covered statutory and contractual discrimination
claims.64 Accordingly, respondents' forum was arbitration, not federal
court. 5
The Supreme Court also spoke briefly to Gardner-Denver's
progeny.66 In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,7 the
Supreme Court considered whether an employee, who unsuccessfully
submitted a wage claim to a joint grievance committee under the terms of
his collective bargaining agreement, could assert a claim under the wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 8 The Supreme Court held
that the employee was not foreclosed from pursuing his claim in federal
court because the arbitration provision did not explicitly incorporate the
type of statutory claim at issue in Barrentine.69 The court held similarly
59. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1466.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1467.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1469.
65. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
66. Id. at 1466.
67. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
68. Id. at 729-30.
69. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1468.
932010]
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in McDonald v. West Branch,70 which entailed a section 1983 claim
under the Civil Rights Act.7 ' Neither case involved the enforceability of
an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims but rather "whether arbitration
of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of
statutory claims."72
Finally, the majority addressed the anti-arbitration dicta in Gardner-
Denver, and explained that such "skepticism . . . rested on a
misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned."7 3
Gardner-Denver "erroneously assumed that an agreement to submit
statutory claims to arbitration was tantamount to a waiver of those
rights."74 The decision to resolve ADEA claims in arbitration does not
waive the substantive right of being free of workplace discrimination but
instead merely substitutes the arbitration forum for that of litigation.75
Second, tracing Gardner-Denver to Wilko v. Swan,76 which held that an
agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 was not
enforceable as a matter of federal law, the court observed that Wilko has
"fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."n Thus, "reliance on
any judicial decision . . . littered with Wilko's overt hostility to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements would be ill-advised." 78
14 Penn Plaza invited two dissents. Justice Stevens' dissent was
prompted by what he characterized as "the court's subversion of
precedent to the policy favoring arbitration." 79 Excoriating the majority
for departing from well-grounded prior decisions, Justice Stevens
asserted that the split of opinion rested largely on how a judge views the
respective lawmaking responsibilities of Congress and the court rather
than on conflicting policy interests.80 He opined, "Judges who have
confidence in their own ability to fashion public policy are less hesitant
to change the law than those of us who are inclined to give wide latitude
to the views of the voters' representatives on non-constitutional
matters."
70. 466 U.S. 284, 286 (1984).
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2010).
72. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1468.
73. Id. at 1469.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
77. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1470.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1474.
80. Id. at 1476.
81. Id.
94 [Vol. 56:85
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Justice Souter also dissented from the majority.82 Joined by Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, this coalition stated that Title VII, much
like ADEA, "contains a vital element . . .. It grants an injured employee
a right of action to obtain the authorized relief."83 Thus, Justice Souter
argued that rights conferred by Title VII [and by extension, other
protective statutes such as ADEA], "cannot be waived as 'part of the
collective bargaining process,' in large measure because 'Title VII . . .
concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal
employment opportunities.' 8 4 The majority's rejoinder to this criticism
was that Justice Souter merely subscribed to "the key analytical mistake
in Gardner-Denver's dicta by equating the decision to arbitrate Title VII
and ADEA claims to a decision to forego these substantive guarantees
against workplace discrimination."85
Both dissents are analytically flawed. Unless arbitration eviscerates
important substantive rights, these arguments reflect the same judicial
hostility and turf protectionism of pre-FAA decisions. Using the mantra
of "stare decisis," the dissents were clear to avoid the "assumption that
arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes," a view now
widely embraced by a Supreme Court majority.86
The Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza, while perhaps not
unanticipated, has stirred interesting controversy on several levels. First,
it is now clear that unions and employers may bargain and agree to
include a mandatory arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement which specifically covers statutory claims. To some extent,
such a clause will offer predictability, and simultaneously enhance the
labor-management relationship by reducing post-grievance litigation that
might otherwise occur if the union member were to get the proverbial
"second bite of the apple." The decision puts to rest, once and for all, the
view of arbitration as a form of second-class justice, provided arbitration
includes the same panoply of protections of civil litigation. However, 14
Penn Plaza triggers a second, practical concern. Under what
circumstances might a union desire to bargain aggressively to include a
mandatory arbitration clause? It is possible, and clearly not far-fetched,
to state that the mere availability of arbitration, which is easier to access,
may in fact increase the number of statutory claims that might otherwise
be filed. This, in turn, would have an adverse impact on the efficiencies
of arbitration. For now, the Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza
82. Id. at 1476.
83. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1477.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1464.
86. Id. at 1478.
2010] 95
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provides the clarity lacking in prior decisions that when a union
negotiates an explicit mandatory arbitration clause covering both
statutory and contractual discrimination claims, the only forum for
redress is arbitration.87
B. Other Statutory Claims
During this Survey period, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the question of whether a terminated employee who signed a
Last Chance Agreement (LCA) waived his right to sue the employer
under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The discharged employee
claimed the employer terminated him in retaliation for filing an age
discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.89
The plaintiff, Hamilton, was a long-term employee of General
Electric (GE) who at the time of his termination had a relatively clean
disciplinary record.90 On June 18, 2004, Hamilton was cited for taking
excessive break time.91 As a result, Whitehouse, his manager, suspended
him for a month.9 2 Shortly after Hamilton returned to work, another
incident arose involving Hamilton's request to have GE honor his
medical restrictions.93 Hamilton left work voluntarily, only to learn
subsequently that he had been terminated due to insubordination.94
On August 17, 2004, less than one month after he was terminated,
Hamilton, GE and the union signed a Last Chance Agreement.95
Hamilton's agreement provided that if GE terminated him for violating
the Last Chance Agreement, "any grievance filed protesting your
discharge [will] not be subject to arbitration and that no legal action
respecting said discharge will be filed."9 6 The Last Chance Agreement
was to remain in effect for two years.97
Hamilton continued to work for GE without incident for almost a
year. Two subsequent altercations led to Hamilton's eventual
87. In cases involving statutory claims, an employee may still pursue independent
relief before the EEOC. However, traditional judicial recourse is foreclosed.
88. Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 430 (2009).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 431.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 431.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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termination.9 9 On May 6, 2005, Hamilton was involved in a dispute over
when he should take his lunch break. 00 According to Hamilton, he went
back to work.o'0 While at work, his supervisor called the guards; he was
escorted out of the building. 0 2 The supervisor's account of this incident
varied, specifically that Hamilton refused to return to work after the
lunch break episode, causing him to call the guards and remove Hamilton
from the plant."0" When Hamilton returned to work the following
Monday, he learned that he had been terminated.1'" The union
intervened, and Hamilton's termination was converted to a thirty day
suspension.105 While serving the suspension, Hamilton filed an age-
discrimination action with the EEOC against GE. 06
On August 9, 2005, Hamilton became embroiled in his last
altercation, when he was told to "move skids" during an assembly line
break.'07 Even though the facts surrounding this final incident are
contested, at least two supervisors confirmed that after Hamilton was
suspended, he swore and threw his badge down.'0 8 This led to
Hamilton's discharge.'09 GE sent to Hamilton a letter which identified
''repeated verbal and written warnings" and the failure of Hamilton to
"abide by Appliance Park Rules of Conduct and GE's policies."'' 0 On
December 14, 2006, fourteen months after his termination, Hamilton
filed suit against GE in state court, asserting that GE had violated the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act by terminating him in retaliation for having
filed an EEOC complaint."' Immediately afterward, GE filed a notice of
removal to the district court based on diversity jurisdiction."12 On GE's
motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Last
Chance Agreement did not bar Hamilton's suit, however, Hamilton could
not establish a prima facie case of retaliatory firing.' 13 From this ruling,
Hamilton appealed.114 On appeal, Hamilton argued that he had provided
99. Id.
100. Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 431.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 432.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 432.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 433.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory
discharge, and that he also made a sufficient showing of pretext.' 15 In
response, GE argued that the district court correctly concluded that
Hamilton's termination was not retaliatory in nature." GE also claimed
that the district court erred in concluding that the Last Chance
Agreement did not foreclose Hamilton from asserting his claims in court,
rejecting GE's waiver argument." 7
The Sixth Circuit concurred in the district court's conclusion that the
LCA did not bar Hamilton's retaliatory discharge suit." 8 "[I]t is the
general rule in this circuit that an employee may not prospectively waive
his or her rights under .. .Title VII."" 9 The court explained:
An employer cannot purchase a license to discriminate. An
employment agreement that attempts to settle prospective
claims of discrimination for job applicants or current employees
may violate public policy ... unless there were continuing or
future effects of past discrimination, or unless the parties
contemplated an unequivocal, complete and final dissolution.120
The Sixth Circuit rejected GE's reliance on Kentucky law, which
permits waivers of statutory claims.121 The two cases on which GE relied
involved situations where an individual was faced with a known
violation.12 2 "Neither case, however, [stood] for the proposition that,
under Kentucky law, an employee [could] prospectively waive statutory
claims relating to potential future violations." 2 3 When Hamilton
executed his Last Chance Agreement, months before his actual
termination, he did not forego future remedies based on GE's future
statutory violations.12 4 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Hamilton's
Last Chance Agreement did not bar the legal action.125
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 433.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 434; see Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W. 3d 99 (2003); see also Am.
Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688 (2002).
123. Hamilton, 556 F.3d at 434.
124. Id. at 435.
125. Id. On the merits, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that: 1) Hamilton
met the requisites of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge; 2) GE satisfied its burden
of producing a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for terminating Hamilton; and, 3)
Hamilton made a sufficient showing of pretext ("a reasonable fact-finder could determine
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III. DEFENSES TO ARBITRATION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In In re Nestorovski Estate,126 the Michigan Court of Appeals, in a
split decision, clarified the scope of the probate court's jurisdiction to
order arbitration when parties agree to arbitrate real estate interests under
a common-law rather than a statutory arbitration agreement. 127 The court
used this critical distinction to hold that the "arbitrability" limitations
which exist in statutory arbitration do not apply when parties agree to
arbitrate under a common-law agreement, thus an arbitrator has the
authority to issue an award involving quitclaim deeds.128 In order to
reach this holding, the court also had to decide whether the parties could
contractually agree to submit the question of testamentary capacity to an
arbitrator for "final and binding" determination.12 9 Over the dissent of
Judge Saad, the court of appeals held that based on procedural
innovations since the promulgation of the 1929 Probate Code and the
"jurisprudential recognition of the 'desirability of arbitration as an
alternative to the complications of litigation,"'30 parties are not
precluded "from conducting binding common-law arbitration of probate
disputes, including the question of testamentary capacity."'31
The case commenced when decedent's daughter initiated suit in
Oakland County Probate Court, challenging the validity of a will and two
deeds executed by her father.132 The petition alleged that decedent's son
had unduly influenced Vlado, her father, and that Vlado lacked
testamentary capacity because he suffered from Alzheimer's at least two
years prior to executing the will and deeds. 3 3 The daughter sought to
that GE waited for, and ultimately contrived, a reason to terminate Hamilton to cloak its
true, retaliatory motive for firing him."). Id. at 436-37. Under these circumstances,
summary judgment was not proper. Id. at 436.
126. 283 Mich. App. 177, 769 N.W.2d 720 (2009).
127. Id. at 200, 769 N.W.2d at 734. Under statutory arbitration, parties must comply
with the requirements of Michigan Arbitration Statute, MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.5005 (West 2010), which allows "[a]ll persons, except infants and persons of
unsound mind" to submit "any controversy existing between them, which might be the
subject of a civil action" memorialized "by an instrument in writing." In re Nestorovski
Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 198, 769 N.W.2d at 733. Statutory arbitration, by definition,
includes award enforcement language. Id.
128. Id. at 201, 769 N.W.2d at 735.
129. Id. at 184, 769 N.W.2d at 726.
130. Id. at 195-96, 769 N.W.2d at 732.
131. Id. at 196, 769 N.W.2d at 732.
132. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 180, 769 N.W.2d at 723-24.
133. Id. at 181, 769 N.W.2d at 724.
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have the will and deeds set aside. 134 The probate court ordered the parties
into facilitation, which resulted in impasse.' On the day the matter was
scheduled for trial, the probate court entered a handwritten order
prepared by the daughter's attorney, and approved by son's attorney,
stating, "[t]his matter is to be scheduled for binding arbitration before a
sole arbitrator to be determined by the parties within one week." 36
Neither party filed an objection to arbitration, and neither attempted to
revoke the agreement before arbitration occurred.137
After three days of extended evidentiary hearings, the arbitrator
prepared a detailed "Arbitration Decision and Award," in which she
found that Vlado had been subject to undue influence. 138 The arbitrator
concluded that Vlado's lack of capacity warranted the setting aside of
two quitclaim deeds he signed in 2001, and the power of attorney he
signed one year earlier. 39 Shortly afterwards, the son filed "Objections
of Certain Provisions" in probate court, contesting the arbitral rulings
related to the real estate and the power of attorney.140 On the same day,
the son also filed a "Supplemental Objection" to the entire arbitration
decision and award, asserting that the probate court did not have the
authority to refer to arbitration estate-based disputes deriving from
Vlado's testamentary capacity.141 The probate court confirmed the
award. 142 Decedent's son appealed.14 3
The Michigan Court of Appeals initially addressed the son's
contention "that because the parties did not have a written arbitration
agreement, the probate court erred by adopting the arbitrator's award."l44
Although decedent's son failed to raise this issue in the probate court, the
court of appeals proceeded to resolve the question because "the question
[was] one of law."l 4 5 Respondent admitted that the probate court entered
a stipulated order of arbitration.14 6 Relying on Phillips v. Jordan,147 the
court of appeals stated that "stipulated orders that are accepted by the
trial court are generally construed under the same rules of construction as
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 181-82, 769 N.W.2d at 724.
138. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 182, 769
139. Id. at 182, 769 N.W.2d at 725.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 183, 769
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 241 Mich. App. 17, 21, 614 N.W.2d 183, 186 (2000).
N.W.2d at 724.
N.W.2d at 725.
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contracts."l 4 8 Because the son participated in the arbitration,149 without
interposing an objection, the appellate court rejected "as factually and
legally unfounded respondent's claim that the parties lacked a written
arbitration agreement."so
Next, the court of appeals reviewed de novo the question of whether
the arbitrator's ruling violated M.C.L.A. section 700.1302, which vests
in the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over estate-related disputes. '5
Respondent's jurisdictional argument was premised on In re Meredith
Estate,15 2 which held that parties by agreement cannot supersede the
probate court's statutorily vested responsibility to assess testamentary
capacity.' 53 Finding In re Meredith Estate inapplicable on the bases of
notice and structural process deficiencies, the court of appeals proceeded
to examine the language of the 1978 Revised Probate Code (RPC),154
which expanded the powers of the probate courts and authorized "the
same powers as the circuit court to hear and determine any matter and
make any proper orders.""' In 1998, the Michigan Legislature
augmented the RPC by enacting the Estates and Protected Individuals
Code (EPIC),'56 conferring "on probate courts the 'exclusive legal and
equitable jurisdiction' of matters that 'relate[] to the settlement of a
deceased individual's estate."" 57 EPIC was considered a "user friendly
code" designed primarily to simplify court procedures, and to lessen
judicial involvement in trusts and estates.'5 8 Given these revisions, the
parallel between probate court proceedings and all other civil
proceedings except as modified by court rule, and at least one recent
court of appeals decision rejecting the notion that arbitration divests a
court of its jurisdiction, the court of appeals stated, "[a]rbitration simply
148. In re Nestorvoski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 183, 769 N.W.2d at 725.
149. The court of appeals stated, "[A] party may not participate in an arbitration and
adopt a 'wait and see' posture, complaining for the first time only if the ruling on the
issue submitted is unfavorable." Id. at 183-84, 769 N.W.2d at 725 (citing Arrow Overall
Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enters, 414 Mich. 95, 99-100, 323 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1982)).
150. Id. at 184, 769 N.W.2d at 725.
151. Id., 769 N.W.2d at 725-26.
152. 275 Mich. 78, 266 N.W.2d 351 (1936).
153. Id. at 291-92, 266 N.W.2d at 353. In In re Meredith Estate, the Michigan
Supreme Court considered whether executors had the authority to submit the question of
the testator's mental capacity to a third party, in this case, a well-known Detroit attorney.
Id. at 285, 266 N.W.2d at 352. The court answered this question in the negative,
reasoning that the probate statutes then in existence did not permit testator competency
issues to be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 292, 266 N.W.2d at 355.
154. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.847 (West 2010).
155. In reNestorvoski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 189, 769 N.W.2d at 728.
156. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 700.1101-8102 (West 2010).
157. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 189, 769 N.W.2d at 728.
158. Id. at 190, 769 N.W.2d at 729.
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removes a controversy from the arena of litigation. It is no more an
ouster of judicial jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement or that
peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity known as the covenant not to
sue."l5 9 Each disposes of issues without litigation.6 0 Thus, the parties in
In re Nestorovski Estate were not precluded from instituting common-
law arbitration of probate disputes, including the question of
testamentary capacity.' 6 '
Next, the court of appeals addressed respondent's argument that the
arbitrator lacked authority to render an award regarding quitclaim
deeds. 162 To decide this issue, the appellate court focused on the
distinction between statutory and common-law arbitration, finding that
for statutory arbitration to occur, parties must comply with the
requirements of the statute.163 In the absence of such compliance, which
was the case here, the parties default to common-law.'64 Under common-
law, and consistent with the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Wold
Architects & Engineers,16 1 the heirs were free to contractually agree to
arbitrate the issue of Vlado's testamentary capacity.166
Respondent's third argument challenged the power of the arbitrator
or the probate court to set aside the power of attorney Vlado executed in
2000 with respect to property he owned in Macedonia.'6 7 Respondent
based his argument on Niemetta v. Teakle,16 8 which held that a court
lacked power "to make decrees affecting property beyond its
jurisdiction." 6 9 Here, contrary to respondent's assertion, the probate
court did not assume jurisdiction over Vlado's property in Macedonia. 170
Thus, the court of appeals held that the arbitrator's recommendation to
the probate court that it set aside the power of attorney based on Vlado's
lack of competency and to treat the foreign property as an asset of the
159. Id. at 192, 769 N.W.2d at 730.
160. Id. at 193, 769 N.W.2d at 730.
161. Id. at 196, 769 N.W.2d at 732.
162. Id. at 197, 769 N.W.2d at 732.
163. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 197-98, 769 N.W.2d at 733.
164. Id. at 198, 769 N.W.2d at 733. See THOMAS L. GRAVELLE & MARY A. BEDIKIAN,
MICHIGAN PLEADING AND PRACTICE, Vol. 8A (2d. ed 1994).
165. 474 Mich. 223, 234, 713 N.W.2d 750, 756 (2006) (holding that common-law and
statutory arbitration co-exist in Michigan, "and the language of the [Michigan Arbitration
Act] does now show an intention to abrogate common law arbitration").
166. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 200, 769 N.W.2d at 734.
167. Id. at 201, 769 N.W.2d at 735.
168. 210 Mich. 590, 178 N.W.2d 37 (1920).
169. Id. at 592-93, 178 N.W.2d at 38.
170. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 202, 769 N.W.2d at 735.
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probate estate was within the arbitrator's authority, as was the ultimate
decision by the probate court to adopt the recommendation.171
Respondent's fourth and final argument related to the scope of
arbitration, an argument which respondent had failed to raise in probate
court.17 2 The court of appeals first explained Michigan's three-part test
for assessing arbitrability, established in Detroit Automotive Inter-
Insurance Exchange v. Reck:173
(1) Is there an arbitration agreement in a contract between the parties;
(2)Is the disputed issue on its face or arguably within the contract's
arbitration clause; and,
(3) Is the dispute expressly exempted from arbitration by the terms of
the contract? 74
Applying this test, the court stated that the parties' stipulation
described the scope of the contemplated arbitration as "[t]his matter." 75
This terminology was broad enough to include distribution of Viado's
entire probate estate, not merely selected assets.17 6 Respondent's failure
to argue this point in the probate court suggested that the parties
understood that the issue was one subject to arbitration. 7
For several reasons, the holding In re Nestorovski Estate is seriously
problematic. First, with respect to the issue of testamentary capacity, it is
clear that the court's primary motivation in circumventing Michigan
Supreme Court precedent was the prevailing view that "the aversion to
arbitration articulated in In re Meredith Estate must give way to the
substantial changes in the substantive and procedural law governing
probate practice," and the desirability of arbitration.'7 ' Even though the
court of appeals, in a footnote, emphasized that their holding neither
overruled In re Meredith Estate nor altered the rule of stare decisis,
this statement alone is insufficient to overcome the fundamental barrier
observed by Judge Saad in his dissent-that the "distinct" issue under
consideration in both cases was whether testamentary capacity is
arbitrable.so In addition, the question of whether the Michigan Supreme
Court would overrule Meredith today is inconsequential. To this point,
Judge Saad observed, "[w]hile the court of appeals may properly express
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 90 Mich. App. 286, 282 N.W.2d 292 (1979).
174. Id. at 290, 282 N.W.2d at 294.
175. In re Nestorvoski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 203, 769 N.W.2d at 736.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 195, 769 N.W.2d at 732.
179. Id. at 196, 769 N.W.2d at 732.
180. Id. at 206, 769 N.W.2d at 737.
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its belief that a decision of this Court was wrongly decided or is no
longer viable, that conclusion does not excuse the court of appeals from
applying the decision to the case before it."' 8 ' Simply put, Michigan
Supreme Court precedent precludes appellate courts from overruling
decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court. 8 2 By "diluting" the holding of
Meredith, the court of appeals "[arrogated] to itself powers it does not
have."'s3
B. Time-Limitations Bar
In 2008, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Warehouse,
Production, Maintenance and Miscellaneous Employees, Furniture,
Piano and Express Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 661 184 v. Zenith
Logistics, Inc.,'8 5 holding that an employer's position of non-
participation in arbitration, communicated to the union in the early stages
of grievance processing, and repeated to the union when the union
transferred its focus from grievance procedures generally to arbitration
specifically, triggers the statute of limitations even if subsequent
communications between employer and union do not explicitly reference
arbitration.18 6
Kroger owned a warehouse in Ohio.18 7 In November 1998, it leased
the warehouse to Zenith, which began providing Kroger with storage and
transportation services.' 88 Zenith hired Kroger's employees and
subsequently negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement to cover
the new hires. 89 Kroger was not a party to the agreement.190
Subsequently, Zenith subcontracted portions of the work,
specifically, "freight dock" and salvage work that had been previously
done at the warehouse.' 9' In response, on January 21, February 2, and
April 7, 2006, the Helpers Union sent grievances to Kroger and Zenith. 19 2
The Teamsters, with which the Helpers Union was affiliated, also filed
grievances with Kroger and Zenith on February 21, February 23, and
181. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 208, 769 N.W.2d at 738.
182. Id. at 206, 769 N.W.2d at 737.
183. Id. at 210, 769 N.W.2d at 739-40.
184. The union is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
185. 550 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2008).
186. Id. at 590.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Zenith Logistics, 550 F.3d at 590.
192. Id. at 591.
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April 3, 2006.'93 On February 3, Kroger's vice president of labor
relations notified Teamsters, with a copy to the union, responding to the
initial grievance and the Teamsters' January 30 letter, asserting that the
agreement was between Zenith and the Teamsters, not Kroger. 194
Teamsters acknowledged Kroger's position but invited Kroger to
participate. 195 Once again, Kroger responded, stating, "any grievances of
disputes Local 135 and 661 have with Zenith Logistics are for those
unions and that employer to resolve and not for [Kroger].",9 6
On April 15, the Helpers Union sent a letter to Kroger enclosing the
April 7 grievance, and acknowledging Kroger's non-participation.'97
This letter informed Kroger, however, of the union's intent to proceed
with the grievances, with or without the participation of Kroger.198 On
April 24, 2006, Kroger's Vice-President responded by enclosing copies
of earlier correspondence which confirmed Kroger's unwillingness to
participate.199 A formal request to arbitrate was then sent to Zenith,
excluding Kroger. 2 00
On June 14, 2006, the Helpers Union filed for arbitration, naming
both Kroger and Zenith as party-respondents. 20 1 The American
Arbitration Association (AAA) acknowledged receipt of the demand, and
enclosed a list of potential arbitrators.2 02 Kroger responded by sending a
letter to the union, with a copy to AAA, asserting that it was not party to
a collective bargaining agreement, thus it would not participate in
arbitration.203
The Helpers Union filed a complaint to compel arbitration, and
Kroger moved to dismiss. 2 04 The district court granted Kroger's motion
on limitations grounds, and the Helpers Union appealed.20 5
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district's holding that the complaint
was filed outside the limitations period.206 Treating Kroger's Rule
12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 56(c) motion for summary judgment "because
its resolution depends on matters neither included in nor referred to in the
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Zenith Logistics, 550 F.3d at 591.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Zenith Logistics, 550 F.3d at 591.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 593-94.
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complaint," the Sixth Circuit examined the fundamental issue of
timeliness.207 The overarching question in this case was not the period of
time for filing the motion which the parties had agreed was subject to a
six-month statute of limitations, but rather when the six-month period
was triggered.208 The Sixth Circuit rejected the Helpers Union's
argument that Kroger's April 24 letter did not refer specifically to
arbitration, thus it did not trigger the statute of limitations. 209 Examining
the context of the letter, the Sixth Circuit noted that by April 24, Kroger
had not once, but twice notified the Teamsters and the union in writing
that it was not a party to the agreement and would not participate in any
aspect of the grievances.210 These communications were "mildly
unequivocal" 211 as they dealt with the grievance process generally, not to
arbitration specifically. 212 The union's April 15 letter dealt specifically
with arbitration, indicating that the union intended to proceed with the
grievances, and stated the union's belief that "the evidence will show that
Kroger is a joint employer with Zenith." 2 13 The Sixth Circuit construed
this correspondence to be referring to arbitration, since the prior
communications did not mention "taking evidence" and moving the
grievances to the next level.214 It was this response that the court of
appeals deemed unequivocal. 2 15 "[T]he unequivocal refusal stand does
not turn on whether the party resisting arbitration has . . . uttered the
magic words 'we refuse to arbitrate this dispute.' 2 16 What matters is that,
by any reasonable measure, the union should have understood Kroger's
April 24 response to be an unequivocal refusal to arbitrate."217
The Sixth Circuit rejected the balance of the union's arguments,
namely that the union did not formally request arbitration before May
16.218 This position, however, skews the focus. Theoretically, under the
union's proposed scheme, even if an employer were to express in no
uncertain terms its unwillingness to arbitrate, all the union would have to
do is simply withhold a formal request. 2 19 "That would only stultify the
207. Id. at 591.
208. Id. at 592.
209. Zenith Logistics, 550 F.3d at 592.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 592.
215. Zenith Logistics, 550 F.3d at 592-93.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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statute."220 Thus, "what is required is not 'rejection' of a Union's formal
request, but refusal to arbitrate.22 1 Such a refusal can be made clear even
in advance of a formal request."222 The fact that Kroger's communication
was directed to the Teamsters, with only a copy to the union, was
immaterial.2 23 Both unions were on notice that Kroger did not intend to
participate in arbitration.224
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND FINALITY
A. Modification of Award
In Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Services, Inc.,2 25 the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to confirm an arbitrator's
award and to refuse to increase the size of the award.226 In 2003, Grain
and Barnes, husband and wife medical doctors, "sued Mercy Hospital
and related defendants for taking a variety of 'punitive actions' that
allegedly interfered with their medical practices." 2 2 7 While Barnes sought
state law relief only, Grain asserted, in addition to state law violations, a
claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C.A. section 1981.228 "[T]he
district court dismissed the state law claims that were subject to a pre-
existing arbitration agreement and stayed the remaining claims pending
arbitration" after the defendants made a motion to compel arbitration.229
Grain and Barnes were awarded $1,641,870.44 in the arbitration
proceeding.2 30 Subsequently, they filed a motion in the district court
seeking to confirm the award but also to simultaneously increase the
damages.21 The district court confirmed the award; however, it refused
to increase the amount.2 32 "After a failed motion to reconsider," Grain
and Barnes appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
2 33
220. Id.
221. Zenith Logistics, 550 F.3d at 592.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Servs., 551 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008).
226. Id. at 380.
227. Id. at 376.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Trinity Health, 551 F.3d at 376.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 377.
233. Id.
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The Sixth Circuit initially considered their jurisdiction to resolve the
appeal.234 Rejecting the final judgment rule, 28 U.S.C.A. section 1291,
and its exceptions, the court of appeals found jurisdiction in 9 U.S.C.A.
section 16(a)(1)(D), which permits appeals from an order confirming an
award.235 The court of appeals explained that this section of the FAA
does not require parties to seek confirmation of the district court's
decision in its entirety.2 36
Next, the court of appeals examined Grain's and Barnes' appeal in
the context of Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA, which provide the
"exclusive regime" for judicial review.237 Section 11 enumerates the
grounds for modification:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of
figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any
person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of
the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting
the merits of the controversy.23 8
Grain and Barnes argued that the award "must" be modified because
of an "evident material miscalculation of figures." 23 9 The court of
appeals found this argument unavailing for two reasons. 2 40 First, the
argument was not raised in the district court.24' Second, for a material
miscalculation to exist, it must be both evident and mathematical.242
Grain's and Barnes' allegation-that the arbitrators made a mistake on
the merits by considering the appropriate start and stop dates for
calculating the interest award-did not fall within the requirements of
Section 11.243
234. See id.
235. Id. at 377-78.
236. Trinity Health, 551 F.3d at 378 (citing Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
1396, 1406 (2008)).
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See Trinity Health, 551 F.3d at 378.
243. Id. at 379.
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Grain's and Barnes' second argument-that the award was imperfect
as to form because it did not include a sufficient grant of attorneys'
fees-was equally unavailing. 244 "An award that is 'imperfect in matter
of form,' . . . is one that suffers from a scrivener's error or that otherwise
does not deliver on the arbitrator's stated purpose in granting relief."2 45
Simply put, this was a dispute over the merits, not the form of the
award.246
Grain's and Barnes' final argument-that the arbitrator's failure to
grant a more substantial award constituted a "manifest disregard of the
law"-was inventive but non-persuasive.247 In rejecting the argument,
the court of appeals explained that the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard is not a statutory basis of judicial review.248 It is judicially
created, and since the United State Supreme Court's decision in Hall v.
Mattel, the use of this standard has been brought into question.249
Moreover, Sixth Circuit precedent holds that the manifest disregard of
the law standard cannot be used to modify an award.250 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order confirming the arbitrator's
award.251
B. Supplemental Award
In another significant decision of this Survey period, Totes Isotoner
Corporation v. International Chemical Workers Union Council/UFCW
Local 664C,25 2 the Sixth Circuit revisited the test ofjudicial review under
collective bargaining agreements, once again re-affirming that an
arbitrator's award is legitimate and must. be upheld where it is drawn
from the collective bargaining agreement and is consistent with the
issues submitted for determination by the parties.253 The appellate court
used this test to strike down an arbitrator's supplemental award,
concluding that such an award exceeded the arbitrator's authority. 25 4
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See Trinity Health, 551 F.3d at 379-80.
249. See id (citing Hall, 128 S. Ct. at 1406).
250. See id. (citing NCR Corp. v. Sac-Co, Inc., 43 F.3d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 1995))
(holding that "[a] court's power to modify an arbitration award is confined to the grounds
specified in [FAA] § 11").
2 5 1. Id.
252. 532 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2008).
253. See id. at 406.
254. See id. at 415.
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Totes Isotoner Corp. entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with a union that represented the company's production and maintenance
employees at the company's distribution center in Butler County,
Ohio.2 55 The agreement memorialized rates of pay, work hours, and
conditions of employment, including health care benefits to be provided
under an "Umbrella of Benefits" plan that was made available to
employees after sixty working days.25 6 Additionally, under the collective
bargaining agreement, both parties agreed that no modification to the
collective bargaining agreement could take place without notice and
consent of the other party and that all grievances under the collective
bargaining agreement would be resolved in the arbitration arena.257
In November of 2001, the company announced changes to the
Umbrella of Benefits plan that included increased costs for health
25insurance premiums and other out-of-pocket expenses.258 Not
surprisingly, the union protested these unilateral changes and in February
of 2002, the union gave notice that it was seeking changes to the 1998
collective bargaining agreement because the existing agreement
automatically terminated when the company sought unilateral changes. 2 59
After negotiations, the two parties reached a new collective bargaining
agreement that went into effect on April 27, 2002 and that also called for
arbitration in the event of grievances.260
On March 19, 2002, the union filed a charge against the company
and the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") alleging that the
company "failed and refused to bargain in good-faith" with regard to the
unilateral changes made to the Umbrella of Benefits plan.261 In
accordance with the 1998 collective bargaining agreement, the NRLB262 o n 7Region 9 deferred the union's charge to arbitration. Thus, on June 17,
2002, the union again filed a grievance seeking to have pre-January 1,
2002 insurance premiums reinstated and employees reimbursed for the
additional premiums paid as a result of the unilateral increase imposed
by the company.263 Still, the parties could not settle the grievance and
therefore submitted it to arbitration before a jointly-selected arbitrator. 264
255. Id. at 406.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 407.
258. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 407.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 407-08.
263. Id.
264. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 408.
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The arbitrator found that the company violated the collective
bargaining agreement when it unilaterally made changes in the
healthcare insurance benefits and, as a result, ordered those changes
rescinded and all of the benefits previously in effect to be reinstated.2 65
Moreover, the employees were to be reimbursed for any and all
additional costs they incurred as a result of the unilateral change and for
all monies spent for benefits that would have been paid for under the
coverage in effect before the changes occurred, but were not paid for
after the changes took effect.266 Finally, the arbitrator ruled that the
company must cease and desist from making unilateral changes to the
collective bargaining agreement and that the arbitrator will retain
jurisdiction over the matter until the award is fully implemented.267
The. company calculated the losses incurred by its employees as a
result of the benefits plan change, but did not revoke the January 1, 2002
change to the healthcare plan or reinstate the prior terms of the Umbrella
of Benefits plan.268 As a result, the union filed another complaint with the
arbitrator arguing that the company was not in compliance with the
arbitrator's March 5, 2004 award.2 69 This non-compliance dispute was
submitted to the arbitrator through supplemental proceedings. 270 The
union argued that the company failed to comply with his previous award
because the company did not "rescind the increase in insurance
premiums and limited its employee reimbursement to the date on which
the 1998 collective bargaining agreement expired," contrary to the
arbitrator's cease and desist order which required the company to make
employees whole for the entire period that the increased premiums were
in effect.2 71
The company argued that the arbitrator's award was effective "only
during the life of the 1998 c/b/a" and noted that the arbitrator heard no
evidence regarding the 2002 collective bargaining agreement or the
negotiations leading up to its inception.272 The company insisted that "a
determination of what health care benefits employees are entitled [to] at
any point in time during the term of the new labor agreement - that is,
after April 26, 2002, can only be determined by an interpretation and
application of the terms of that agreement" and "to the extent that the
union complained about benefit premiums after April 26, 2002, the
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 408.
268. Id. at 408-09.
269. Id. at 409.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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company" argued that "the union must file a separate grievance under the
2002 collective bargaining agreement."273
After hearing arguments from both sides, the arbitrator asked for a
copy of the 2002 c/b/a and the company complied, but did so only "as a
convenience to the arbitrator." 2 74 The arbitrator found that the company
was not in compliance with is March 5, 2004 award, and issued an award
in a quasi-injunctive form of relief via a cease and desist order even
though the NLRB and the courts have long recognized that arbitrators
have limited authority to issue this form of relief.2 75 In doing so, the
arbitrator noted that, like the old collective bargaining agreement,
nothing in the new agreement gives the company the right to make
unilateral changes to the employee's health insurance benefit program.27 6
The arbitrator ordered the company to "comply with the provisions of the
March 5, 2004 Award," and once again retained jurisdiction over the
matter until the award was fully implemented.2 77
Subsequently, the company filed a complaint with the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking to have the
arbitrator's supplemental award set aside and vacated. 27 8 The company
alleged that the arbitrator acted outside of his authority when he
interpreted the 2002 collective bargaining agreement in rendering his
supplemental award.279 The union counterclaimed, requesting that the
court enforce "both the supplemental award as well as the arbitrator's
original March 5, 2004 Award." 2 80 Finally, the parties each filed cross
motions for summary judgment. 2 8 1 "The district court confirmed the
original March 5, 2004 award but vacated the Arbitrator's supplemental
award, and remanded the compliance issue back to the arbitrator for
further proceedings."282 The union timely appealed to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 283
The court initially discussed the applicable de novo standard of
review of a district court's grant of summary judgment in a labor
arbitration proceeding.2 84 In the context of arbitration, the appellate court
273. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 409.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 410.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 410.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See id. at 410.
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recognized that "courts play only a limited role" and that "review of an
arbitration award 'is one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in
all of American jurisprudence."' 2 85 Using this tightly circumscribed
standard, the appellate court first turned to the Steelworkers' Trilogy
test-"that an arbitrator's award is legitimate and must be upheld if it is
drawn from the collective bargaining agreement and the issues submitted
for determination by the parties."286 As long as an arbitrator is "even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope
of this authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision." 28 7 This is because the
parties have contracted for the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract,
not the court's interpretation.288
The court then examined the scope of judicial review in the context
of Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. Service Employees International
Union Local 517M,289 in which this court further narrowed the scope of
labor arbitration disputes.290 In Michigan Family Resources, the Sixth
Circuit overruled the test established in Cement Division, National
Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica,29 1 and announced a new
test:
Arbitration awards should be reversed on appeal only where a
"procedural aberration" occurs within the arbitration process. To
determine whether a procedural aberration has occurred, [the]
Court must ask:
Did the arbitrator act 'outside his authority' by resolving a
dispute not committed to arbitration? Did the arbitrator
commit fraud, have a conflict of interest or otherwise act
dishonestly in issuing his award? And in resolving any legal or
285. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 411 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. V. Tenn. Valley
Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1999)).
286. Id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)).
287. Id. (quoting Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509
(2001)).
288. Id. at 411 (citing United Paper Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987)).
289. Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 517M, 475 F.3d
746, 756 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
290. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 412 (citing Mich. Family Res. Inc., 475 F.3d at 756).
291. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 793 F.2d 759,
766 (6th Cir. 1986).
2010] 113
HeinOnline -- 56 Wayne L. Rev. 113 2010
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
factual disputes in the case, was the arbitrator arguably
construing or applying the contract? 292
The Sixth Circuit explained that an arbitrator may "arguably construe
a contract" in a supplemental proceeding "which clarifies or enforces an
original" as long as it is rooted in the relevant c/b/a." 29 3 Here, however,
the arbitrator acted outside his authority by reaching a dispute not
committed to arbitration - whether the unilateral healthcare benefits
increase was violative of the 2002 collective bargaining agreement.294 In
reaching this decision, the Sixth Circuit made clear that it was not
deciding the issue of whether the arbitrator could issue quasi-injunctive
relief, or whether he could issue such relief after the expiration of the
1998 collective bargaining agreement.29 5 The question before the
appellate court was whether an arbitrator's decision to stray from the
1998 collective bargaining agreement, and issue a supplemental award
which drew its essence from the 2002 collective bargaining agreement,
constituted the type of procedural aberration that would run afoul of
Michigan Family Resources narrow review standard.2 96 Relying on two
Sixth Circuit cases, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Toshiba America29 7 and Peterbilt Motors Co. v. UAW Int'l Union,2 98 the
appellate court concluded that the district court properly vacated the
arbitrator's supplemental award.2 99 Guided by the important policy of
freedom of contract, the court explained:
Indeed, were we to uphold the arbitrator's supplemental
decision, as the dissent would urge us to do, we would likely
undermine the parties' freely negotiated, bargaining-for-
procedures which require the submission of a grievance prior to
the determination of remedies. This end-run around the
collective bargaining agreement would, therefore, produce a
windfall to the union by opening up an opportunity for the union
to seek sanctions against the company for the violations of the
2002 CBA as found by the arbitration. The company, on the
292. Id. at 412.
293. Id. (citing Sterling China Co. v. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied
Workers Local 24, 357 F.3d 546, 557 (6th Cir. 2004)).
294. Id. at 414.
295. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 413 (quoting Mich. Family Res., Inc., 475 F.3d at
753).
296. See id. at 414, 415, 420.
297. 879 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1989).
298. 219 F. App'x 434,438 (6th Cir. 2007).
299. Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 416.
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other hand, would be stuck with a decision, rendered in the
absence of a full hearing, finding that it violated the 2002 CBA.
In the end, both the union and the company would have been
subjected to remedies and obligations under the 2002 CBA that
they did not agree to arbitrate. For this reason alone, we must
vacate the arbitrator's supplemental award.3 00
Finally, the majority rejected the union's argument in support of
sustaining the supplemental award that an arbitrator's powers are co-
extensive with the National Labor Relations Board.3 0 1 The Sixth Circuit
held that even if the arbitrator did possess such powers, nothing in the
authorities cited by the union hold that an arbitrator has the authority to
determine that a violation of a new agreement occurred absent a separate
charge or grievance being filed under that agreement.30 2 Clearly, this was
not the case here.303
Judge McKeague dissented, arguing that the arbitrator had directed
the company to cease and desist from unilaterally increasing the
employees' share of health care insurance premium costs. 30 4 It could be
argued that this directive "was reasonably intended to apply beyond the
expiration of the 1998 CBA."3 05 In order to determine whether the
directive had been complied with, the arbitrator would have to go outside
the 1998 collective bargaining agreement and examine the relevant
306
evidence, in this case, the 2002 collective bargaining agreement.36 Here,
the arbitrator issued the Original Award in March 2004, after the
expiration of the 1998 collective bargaining agreement. 307 "By definition,
any forward-looking, 'quasi-injunctive' relief awarded at that time must
have had life beyond the date the 1998 CBA expired to avoid being a
nullity."30 8
Judge McKeague's argument in dissent presents the more
compelling view. It has long been observed that arbitration is the sine
qua non for the union's right not to strike. 3 09 Thus, in the end, remedies
300. Id. at 416 n.3.
301. Id. at 417.
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. Id. at 419 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
305. See Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 419 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 422.
308. Id.
309. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(relying on a Senate report that explained Congress' interest in promoting collective
bargaining that ended with agreements not to strike - "[T]he chief advantage which an
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for violations of the collective bargaining agreement are provided
through the arbitration vehicle. 310 Collective bargaining agreements are
by definition ambiguous and often incomplete. The document does not
represent the totality of the relationship but merely the parties' best
estimate at the bargaining table of the issues that will dominate the
relationship going forward. Thus, as Judge McKeague points out, the
arbitrator's Original Award would have little meaning - other than to
refund the premiums under the 1998 collective bargaining agreement -
if the company were permitted to impose the desired changes in the
successor contract without engaging in the bargaining process.3 " The
only remedy available is the one pursued by the union - to file a
grievance and obtain an arbitrator's determination on whether the
company's action was proper.3 12
C. Confirmation
In Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v. Evangel Builders &
Construction Managers, LLC,3 13 the Michigan Supreme Court decided
the question of whether a general contractor's failure to file an award
with the circuit court precluded the court from confirming it.3 14
Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry (Ministry) filed suit in
connection with a church Evangel was contracted to build.31 ' Evangel
hired defendants, HMC Mechanical Corp and its owner, Leslie Upfall, as
subcontractors, to perform some of the work under the contract.3 16
Ministry asserted in the complaint that the defendants performed
defective work, and they were paid for services not completed.3 17 Cross-
claims and counter-claims followed, including a separate suit by one of
the subcontractors against HMC, Upfall, Evangel Builders, Ministry and
employer can reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of
uninterrupted operation during the term of the agreement. Without some effective method
of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little
reason why an employer would desire to sign such a contract").
310. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, SEVENTH EDITION (Alan
Miles Ruben, ed., 2003) ("An agreement to arbitrate effects a complete surrender of any
right of the employer to determine the controversy by unilateral action and of any right of
both parties to support their contentions by a show of economic strength.")
311. See Totes Isotoner, 532 F.3d at 422.
312. Id.
313. 282 Mich. App. 410, 766 N.W.2d 874 (2009).
314. Id. at 411, 766 N.W.2d at 875.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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others for damages arising out of the church construction project. 318 The
actions were consolidated, and the parties, on stipulation, proceeded to
binding arbitration under the Michigan Arbitration Act, M.C.L.A.
sections 600.5001 to 600.5035.319
The arbitrator issued an award, finding that Upfall was jointly and
severally liable with HMC to Evangel Builders and Colbert, the owner of
Evangel Builders, in the amount of $75,000.320 Five days after the
arbitrator decided the case, KEK Enterprises filed the arbitration award
with the clerk of the court.32' Upfall sought protection under the
Bankruptcy Code.322 The trial court entered judgment on June 27,
2006.323 Following entry of order by the United States Bankruptcy Court,
the trial court set aside the judgment and entered a new (but substantially
same) judgment on July 13, 2007.324 Upfall requested reconsideration,
which the trial court denied.325 An appeal followed.326
Upfall initially argued that the trial court's judgment was improperly
entered, as it did not meet the requirements of MCR 3.602(I).327 MCR
3.602(I) states:
Award; Confirmation by Court. An arbitration award filed with
the clerk of the court designated in the agreement or statute
within one year after the award was rendered may be confirmed
by the court, unless it is vacated, corrected, or modified, or a
decision is postponed, as provided in this rule.328
Applying this rule to Upfall's argument, the Michigan Court of
Appeals stated that nothing in the language of MCR 3.602(I) required all
parties seeking to enforce an award to separately file the award with the
court clerk.329
Next, Upfall asserted that MCR 3.602(I) "requires that judgment on
an arbitration award be entered within one year" of the date the award is
318. Id., 766 N.W.2d at 876.
319. Greater Bethesda, 282 Mich. App. at 411, 766 N.W.2d at 876 (2009); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-600.5035 (West 2009).
320. Id. at 411-12, 766 N.W.2d at 876.
321. Id. at 412, 766 N.W.2d at 876.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Greater Bethesda, 282 Mich. App. at 412, 766 N.W.2d at 876.
326. Id.
327. MICH. CT. R. § 3.602(I) (West 2009).
328. Greater Bethesda, 282 Mich. App. at 412, 766 N.W.2d at 876 (quoting MICH. CT.
R. § 3.602()).
329. Id. at 413, 766 N.W.2d at 876.
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issued.330 Since the trial court entered judgment on July 13, the judgment
was in error.33 1 The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this argument
with equal force, stating that "statutory language must be read within its
grammatical context unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed." 3 32
Using the "last antecedent" rule of statutory construction, i.e., that a
modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined
solely to the immediately preceding clause, here the clause "within one
year after the award was rendered" applies to the filing of the award with
the court clerk, not to the confirmation of the award by the court.333 Since
the appellant had not filed an application to vacate, modify, or correct the
arbitration award, the confirmation and entry of judgment was proper. 33 4
V. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
In Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle,33s the United States Supreme
Court held that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement had the right
to appeal a district court's decision to deny a Section 3 motion to stay
pursuant to section 16(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Arbitration Act.336
Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) consulted with Arthur
Andersen to reduce taxes on the 1999 sale of their construction-
equipment business.33 ' Two other advisers - Bricolage Capital and
Curtis, Mallet Prevost Colt & Mosle - joined forces with Arthur
Andersen in recommending to Carlisle that he consider a tax shelter
known as a "leveraged option strategy."3 3 8 To implement the strategy,
Carlisle was asked to execute an investment-management agreement
with Bricolage. 339 The agreement included a standard AAA arbitration
clause, which provided that "[a]ny controversy arising out of or relating
to this Agreement or the br[ea]ch thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association."340
330. Id.
3 3 1. Id.
332. Id. at 414, 766 N.W.2d at 877.
333. Id.
334. Greater Bethesda, 282 Mich. App. at 414, 766 N.W.2d at 877.
335. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
336. See id. at 1899 (citing 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 3, 16(a)(1)(A) (West 2009)).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
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The IRS later determined that the leveraged option strategy was an
illegal tax shelter.34 1 The IRS offered an amnesty program, but Bricolage
did not notify Carlisle that he could seek shelter under it.342 Carlisle was
forced to enter into a settlement agreement with the IRS, involving the
payment of over $25 million in taxes and penalties.343
Carlisle filed a diversity suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky
against Bricolage, Arthur Andersen, and two individual employees of
Bricolage, alleging fraud, civil conspiracy, malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty, and negligence. 344 Arthur Andersen responded by
invoking Section 3 of the FAA, demanding that Carlisle arbitrate its
claims as required by the arbitration clause in the Carlisle-Bricolage
agreement.345 The district court denied the motion.346 On interlocutory
appeal, the Sixth Circuit dismissed "for want of jurisdiction." 347 Given
the importance of the jurisdictional question, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.348
The Supreme Court made two separate rulings. First, speaking
through Justice Scalia, the court concluded that Section 16(a)(1)(A),
which provides that "an appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . .
refusing a stay of any action under Section 3 of this title," is clear and
unambiguous. 3 49 Rationalizing that "jurisdiction over the appeal must be
determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather
than upon the strength of the grounds of reversing the order," 35 0 the
Supreme Court made clear that the underlying merits are simply
irrelevant, "for even utter frivolousness of the underlying request of a § 3
stay cannot turn a denial into something other than an order . . . refusing
a stay of any action under Section 3.,35 The court observed that even if
the decision were to engage the courts of appeal in fact-intensive
jurisdictional inquiries (respondent's primary argument), it would not
alter its reading of Section 16.352 Merits determinations are easier once
the court has accepted jurisdiction.353
341. Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1899.
342. Id.
343. See id.
344. Id. 1899-1900.
345. Id. at 1900.
346. Id.
347. Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1900.
348. See id.
349. See id. (citing 9 U.S.C.A. § 16(a)(1)(A)).
350. Id. (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996)).
351. Id. at 1901.
352. See id.
353. See Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1901.
2010] 119
HeinOnline -- 56 Wayne L. Rev. 119 2010
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
The court also addressed the alternative ground, i.e., that parties who
are not signatories to a written arbitration agreement are categorically
ineligible for Section 3 relief.35 4 In examining both the content of
Sections 2 and 3, the court explained that neither provision alters the
requirement that courts look to state contract law to assess the scope of
the agreement, including who is bound to arbitrate.355 Under state law, a
non-signatory to a contract may be bound through "assumption, piercing
the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party
beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel." 35 6 The court stated: "There is
no doubt that, where state law permits it, a third-party claim is 'referable
to arbitration under an agreement in writing."' 3 5 7 "It is not our role to
conform an unambiguous statute to what we think 'Congress probably
intended.'" 35 1
Finally, the court addressed respondents' fallback argument
comprised of reliance on dicta of earlier opinions, namely First Options
and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.35 9 With respect to First Options, the
court said the dicta pertained to issues the parties agreed to arbitrate, not
whether there was an underlying agreement to arbitrate. 3 60 And Waffle
House, Inc. involved a determination of whether a third party,
specifically the EEOC, was bound to arbitrate under a contract to which
it was not party. 361 "Neither case raises the question of whether an
arbitration agreement otherwise enforceable by (or against) third parties
"triggers protection under the FAA."362
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens,
dissented.6 They argued that the question is whether section 16 "opens
the door to [a Section 3 appeal] at the behest of one who has not signed a
written arbitration agreement. 364 The dissent took issue with the
majority's assumption that section 3 is "merely a labeling requirement,
without substantive import."36 5 With respect to interlocutory appeals
specifically, any interruptions to the "normal process of litigation"
354. See id. at 1902.
355. Id.
356. Id. (quoting Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 57:19 (4th ed. 2001)).
357. Id. at 1902 n.6.
358. Id.
359. Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1902-03; First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938 (1995); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
360. Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1902-03 (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943).
361. Id. (citing Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 294).
362. Id. at 1903.
363. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
364. Id.
365. See Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1903.
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366 *
should be carefully circumscribed. Thus, a preferred way of limiting
the scope of such extraordinary interruption is to perform a "look
through" of the section 3 petition, and confine its usage only to
signatories of the underlying arbitration agreement. 36 7 "While it is
hornbook contract law that third parties may enforce contracts for their
benefit as a matter of course, interlocutory appeals are a matter of limited
grace." 3 68 Responding to the majority's point that savvy parties who
"game the system" may be subject to sanctions, the dissent explained that
sanctions tend to apply to the frivolous, "not to the far-fetched." 36 9
During this Survey period, the United States Supreme Court also
decided Vaden v. Discover Bank,370 which involved two questions: First,
whether a federal court may "look through" a petition to compel
arbitration, asserted under the Federal Arbitration Act, to the parties'
underlying substantive controversy and, second, whether a federal court
may entertain a petition to compel arbitration based on the content of a
counterclaim. 37 1 To decide these issues, the Supreme Court was required
to revisit the "substantive supremacy" of the FAA, which presents an
interesting anomaly in the realm of federal legislation because it is not a
source of subject-matter jurisdiction.37 2
The case originated in state court, when Discover Bank filed a
breach of contract claim against its cardholder, Vaden, to recover past
due charges of $10,610.74, plus interest and counsel fees.373 Vaden
responded and counterclaimed, alleging that Discover's financial
charges, interest, and late fees violated Maryland's credit laws.374 Even
though the credit card agreement contained an arbitration clause,
Discover Bank did not initially avail itself of this provision.3 75 It was not
until Vaden filed her response and counterclaim that Discover then
invoked Section 4 of the FAA, which permits a federal court to compel
arbitration, provided the underlying controversy "arises under" federal
law. 7 Although the counterclaims were grounded in state law, Discover
argued that they were pre-empted by section 27(a) of the Federal Deposit
366. See Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1904.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009).
371. Id. at 1268.
372. See id. at 1271-72.
373. Id. at 1268.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1268-69.
376. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1269; see supra note 37 for text of statutory language.
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Insurance Act (FDIA). The district court ordered arbitration, and
Vaden appealed.378 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction, instructing
it to undertake this review by "looking through" the section 4 petition to
the substantive controversy between the parties and assess whether it
presented "a properly invoked federal question."3 7 9 Vaden conceded that
her state-law claims were pre-empted under section 27 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act.380 The district court granted Discover's motion,
and ordered the parties into arbitration.38 i Vaden appealed this decision,
asserting in part that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
to review the petition.382 The Fourth Circuit, in a split vote, affirmed.383
In conducting its own analysis, the majority subordinated the "well-
pleaded complaint" rule of Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc.,384 and concluded instead "that the complete
preemption doctrine is paramount." 3 85 In other words, the FDIA pre-
empted Vaden's state-law claims, thus the district court was empowered
to entertain the Section 4 petition.8 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, to resolve the split among the
lower federal courts, namely whether federal courts must find
jurisdiction on the face of the petition or whether they may "look
through" the petition and take into account the federal character of the
underlying controversy.3 87 The circuits that adopted the narrow approach
held that a district court was without authority to entertain a section 4
377. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831d(a) (West 2009) (providing in relevant part: In order to
prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository institutions . . . with
respect to interest rates . . . such State bank[s] . . . may, notwithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section, take,
receive, reserve, charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange,
other evidence of debt, interest at a rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the
bank is located.); Vaden, 129 S Ct. at 1269.
378. Vaden, 129 S.Ct. at 1269.
379. Id.
380. Vaden, 129 S.Ct. at 1269.
381. Id.
382. See id.
383. Id. at 1269.
384. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
385. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1270.
386. Id.
387. See Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 463 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the district court may "look through" the petition and focus on the underlying
dispute). Accord Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 99 (6th Cir. 1997);
Westmoreland Capital Corp v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 267-69 (2nd Cir. 1996);
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 986-89 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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petition if the underlying controversy raised a federal question. 8 The
broader approach permits a federal court to "look through" the petition
and determine if a federal question is present.389
In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held
that a district court may "look through" a section 4 petition to determine
whether or not it has subject-matter jurisdiction.390 The court reached this
decision by examining the text of section 4, finding the phrases, "save for
[the arbitration] agreement" and "jurisdiction under title 28" to mean
jurisdiction over the parties' underlying controversy. 39' The court
observed that even though this approach was not consistent with the
mainstream view of most federal circuits which had rejected the "look
through" standard, it is textually in line with the statutory frame of the
FAA.392 Adopting Vaden's argument, that the "controversy between the
parties" is "simply and only the parties' discrete dispute over the
arbitrability of their claims," does not comport with the language.
"Section 4 directs courts to determine whether they would have
jurisdiction "save for [the arbitration] agreement." 3 94 In rejecting
Vaden's argument that the "save for" clause was to ensure that courts
were not ousted of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court explained that section
2 of the FAA, the Act's "centerpiece provision" addressed the
problem. 395 This section mandates that agreements to arbitrate are "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 396 Vaden's approach, to link
the "save for" language to the 'ouster of jurisdiction' is imaginative, but
utterly unfounded and historically inaccurate."397 In addition, Vaden's
approach would also assume impractical consequences. 9 It would
essentially permit a federal court to entertain a section 4 petition in only
three specific instances - when a federal question suit is before the
court, when the parties satisfy the requirements for diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, or when the dispute over arbitrability involves a
maritime contract.399 Under this approach, someone who could file a
388. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1275.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1273.
392. Id. at 1274.
393. Id.
394. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1274.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1275.
398. See id.
399. Id.
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federal question suit but who had not done so would not be able to avail
themselves of the advantages of a section 4 petition. The "look through"
approach enables parties to seek federal intervention on the question of
whether arbitration should be compelled "without first taking a formal
step of initiating or removing a federal question suit.,400
With respect to the second fundamental question of jurisdiction,
however, the Supreme Court split five to four, holding that counterclaims
cannot be the basis for jurisdiction. 40 ' The majority began its analysis by
examining the language of Section 2, which authorizes a United States
district court to entertain a petition to compel arbitration if the court
would have jurisdiction, "save for [the arbitration] agreement," over "a
suit arising out of the controversy between the parties."402 Taking issue
with the Fourth Circuit's identification of the "dimensions of 'the
controversy between the parties,"' the majority held that appellate court
focused only on a "slice of the parties' entire controversy," specifically
Vaden's counterclaims. 4 03 "Lost from sight was the triggering plea-
Discover's claim for the balance due on Vaden's account."A4 The
majority observed that it is well-recognized federal rule that jurisdiction
cannot be created via defense or counterclaim.40 5 In taking issue with the
dissent's characterization of "controversy," the court opined:
Artful dodges by a § 4 petitioner should not divert us from
recognizing the actual dimensions of that controversy. The text
of § 4 instructs federal courts to determine whether they would
have jurisdiction over "a suit arising out of the controversy
between the parties"; it does not give § 4 petitioners license to
recharacterize an existing controversy, or manufacture a new
controversy, in an effort to obtain a federal court's aid in
compelling arbitration.406
Because the majority found that Discover's claim against Vaden was
filed as a state law cause of action, which voided appellate court
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals affirming the district court's order and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.407
400. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1275.
401. See id. at 1278.
402. Id. at 1275.
403. Id. at 1268.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1278.
406. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1276.
407. See id. at 1279.
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The impact of Vaden is that parties who seek federal court
intervention will closely examine how they wish to fashion their initial
complaint. While the "look through" approach provides some elasticity,
practitioners must recognize that this is only an initial inquiry-to
determine whether an underlying federal controversy exists. In most
instances where a section 4 petition fails, the state enforcement remedy is
still available. Section 2 of the FAA binds state courts, and renders
agreements to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."8 State
court analogues to the FAA generally contain similar enforcement
language. In Vaden, Discover could have sought an order from Maryland
state court to compel arbitration of Vaden's claims, an avenue it chose
not to exercise. The clarity of the Supreme Court's decision in Vaden,
however, will better inform practitioners of their pleading options.
VI. DOMESTIC RELATIONS ARBITRATION
In Washington v. Washington,40 9 the Michigan Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority when
he awarded the wife assets of substantially less value based on his
assessment that the wife dissipated assets unreasonably during the time
leading up to the divorce.4 10 In affirming the lower court's ruling, the
court of appeals held that unequal property distribution in a divorce
action is not contrary to law, as long as it is based on proper criteria.4 11
Defendant wife appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to
vacate the arbitrator's award.4 12 The parties had been married for
approximately fourteen years when the plaintiff husband filed for
divorce.413 The parties reached a partial settlement through mediation;
however, property issues remained unresolved.4 14 To achieve closure, the
parties entered into an arbitration agreement, which specified that they
would be "guided by the laws of the state of Michigan during the
arbitration process and also agree that the Rules of Evidence may be
applied or relaxed at the discretion of the Arbitrator."415 The parties
selected an arbitrator, who conducted a hearing and made an award.416
The arbitrator determined that the fair market value of the husband's
408. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2009).
409. Mich. App. 667, 770 N.W.2d 908 (2009).
410. See id. at 670, 770 N.W.2d at 912.
411. Id. at 673, 770 N.W.2d at 913.
412. Id. at 668, 770 N.W.2d at 910.
413. Id. at 668, 770 N.W.2d at 910-11.
414. See id. at 668-69, 770 N.W.2d at 911.
415. See Washington, 283 Mich. App. at 673 n.5, 770 N.W.2d at 913 n.5.
416. Id. at 669, 770 N.W.2d at 911.
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dental practice was $165,000, however, because child support and
spousal support would come out of the husband's dental practice, the
arbitrator devalued the practice to $99,000, for purposes of dividing the
property; the practice was awarded to the husband.417
The arbitrator also valuated the property on which the dental practice
was located, using the same fair market valuation formula.418 After
taking into account the existing mortgage of $47,000, the arbitrator
determined the fair market value of the property to be $123,'000.419 In
addition, the arbitrator awarded other assets including the wife's personal
injury settlement proceeds, cars, bank accounts, and play furniture for the
children.420 In the end, the total value of the assets awarded to the
husband was $177,428 more than what he awarded to the wife.421
However, the arbitrator explained that this division of property was
equitable for two reasons.42 2 First, the wife made $80,555 of home
improvements using the parties' home equity line of credit, "less than
necessary and beyond that which the parties could afford.A 23 Thus, these
expenses were properly attributable to the wife, with "remainder of the
expenses joint in nature."424 Second, with respect to the wife's personal
injury settlement, a portion should be taken into account "in the overall
award."42 5
The wife subsequently filed with the trial court a motion to vacate
the arbitrator's award, asserting that the arbitrator: 1) exceeded his
jurisdictional authority; 2) displayed evident partiality; and, 3) rendered
an untimely award by exceeding the time limits specified by statute. 26
The Michigan Court of Appeals began its analysis by articulating the
narrow standard of judicial review operative in arbitration.427 This
standard is no less in domestic relations arbitration proceedings. 28 Under
the Michigan Arbitration Act, a reviewing court may vacate a domestic
relations arbitration award under the following circumstances:
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 670, 770 N.W.2d at 911.
421. Washington, 283 Mich. App. at 670, 770 N.W.2d at 911.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 670, 770 N.W.2d at 912.
427. Washington, 283 Mich. App. at 671, 770 N.W.2d at 912.
428. Id.
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(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means.
(b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a
party's rights.
(c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.
(d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing
of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to prejudice
substantially a party's rights. 4 29
Under Michigan law, arbitrators exceed their authority "whenever
they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they
primarily draw their authority, or in contravention of controlling
principles of law.'A30 To determine whether the arbitrator has strayed
from his contractual obligation, "any error of law must be discernible on
the face of the award itself."4 3 1 In other words, it is not permissible for a
reviewing court to scrutinize "intermediate mental indicia.'A32 "CoUrtS
will not engage in a review of an 'arbitrator's mental path leading to
[the] award.", 33 Thus, in order to vacate an award for legal error, such
error must be "so substantial that, but for the error, the award would have
been substantially different.'A34
Applying the above tests to this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected the wife's argument that a facially inequitable award subjected
the award to vacatur.4"35 The appellate court explained that the goal in
dividing marital property is to reach an equitable distribution in light of
all the circumstances.436 Such a distribution "need not be an equal
distribution, as long as there is an adequate explanation for the chosen
distribution."437 In this case, the arbitrator adequately explained that the
429. Id. at 671-72, 770 N.W.2d at 912 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5081(2) (West 2009)).
430. Id. at 672, 770 N.W.2d at 912; see Dohanyos v. Detrex Corp., 217 Mich. App.
171, 176, 550 N.W.2d 608, 611 (1996).
431. Id. at 672, 770 N.W.2d at 913.
432. Id.
433. Washington, 283 Mich. App. at 672, 770 N.W.2d at 913.
434. Id. (quoting Krist v. Krist, 246 Mich. App. 59, 67, 631 N.W.2d 53 (2001)).
435. See id. at 672-74, 770 N.W.2d at 913-14.
436. Id. at 673, 770 N.W.2d at 913.
437. Id.
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basis for distributing assets was largely driven by the wife's profligate
spending habits leading up to the divorce.43 8 This constitutes a factual
finding which is beyond the scope of judicial review. 439 As to whether
the arbitrator erred by considering in the division of marital property part
of the non-economic damages obtained from the personal injury
settlement, the court of appeals stated that the arbitrator acted within his
authority by recognizing the controlling law.440 The assets were available
for distribution, "to ensure an equitable distribution of property."" 1 Thus,
the court of appeals concluded that nothing on the face of the award
would suggest a Gavin-violation, and accordingly, the arbitrator did not
exceed his authority when he rendered an award that split assets in
disparate proportions." 2
Finally, with respect to the wife's timeliness argument - that the
arbitrator violated M.C.L.A. section 600.5078(1) by not issuing his
ruling within sixty days after the arbitration hearing - the court of
appeals concluded that the wife failed to show the impact of a timely
ruling." 3 The arbitrator fulfilled his obligation under the law by
convening a hearing and rendering an award based on his factual
findings.4 That he did not render such an award within the sixty days
was of no consequence where it could not be shown that the delay had
any effect on the property division in the arbitration ruling." Thus, the
trial court did not err in denying the wife's motion on this ground." 6
VII. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
Between 2008 and 2009 five states introduced bills relating to the
Uniform Mediation Act." 7 Hawaii introduced House Bill 782 and Senate
Bill 120."8 Passed in the Senate, the House will review the bill in the
438. Id. at 674, 770 N.W.2d at 913.
439. Washington, 283 Mich. App. at 675, 770 N.W.2d at 914.
440. Id. at 674, 770 N.W.2d at 914.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 675, 770 N.W.2d at 914.
443. Id. at 676 n.6, 770 N.W.2d at 915 n.6.
444. See id.
445. See Washington, 283 Mich. App. at 676 n.6, 770 N.W.2d at 915 n.6.
446. See id. at 676, 770 N.W.2d at 915.
447. Uniform Law Commissioners, The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About The Uniform Mediation Act, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma2001.asp (last
visited November 16, 2009).
448. S.B. 120, Reg. Sess (Hi. 2009); H.B. 782, Reg. Sess. (Hi. 2009).
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2010 regular session."4 In February 2009, the Rhode Island Senate
introduced the UMA in Senate Bill 765.450 The bill was referred to
committee where it is currently being held for study.451 The Maine
Legislature also introduced the UMA in 2009.452 The two bills were
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and will be carried over to
the next session.453 In Massachusetts, House Bill 94 introduced the
UMA.454 In September, the House discharged the bill to the Joint
Committee on the Judiciary.455 New York introduced the UMA in both
houses as AB 8497 and SB 5422.456 In May, it was referred to the
Assembly Judiciary Committee and the Senate Codes Committee.4 5 7 The
number of states (including the District of Columbia) adopting the UMA
remains at eleven (D.C., Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington).45 8
The State Bar of Michigan ADR Section's Effective Practices and
Procedures Committee (EPP) began reviewing the Uniform Mediation
Act in late 2008.459 The State Courts Administrative Office's (SCAO)
Office of Dispute Resolution formed a Mediation Confidentiality and
Standards of Conduct Committee at the end of 2008.460 The EPP decided
to withhold final comment until the SCAO committee finished their
work.461 Through multiple meetings and numerous drafts, the SCAO
committee created proposed rule MCR 2.412 which utilizes many (but
not all) of the features of UMA.
449. Hawaii State Legislature, 2009 Regular Session, SBl20 Status, available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2009/lists/measureindiv.aspx?billtype=SB&billnu
mber-1 20 (last visited November 16, 2009).
450. S. 765 (R.I. 2009).
451. State of Rhode Island General Assembly, Legislative Status Report, available at
http://dirac.rilin.state.ri.us/BillStatus/WebClass1.ASP?WCI=BillStatus&WCE=ifrmBillS
tatus&WCU (last visited November 16, 2009).
452. H.P. 968 (Me. 2009); L.D. # 1378 (Me. 2009).
453. State of Maine Legislature, Actions for LD1378, available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/LawMakerWeb/dockets.asp?ID=280032522 (last visited
November 16, 2009).
454. H.B. 94 (Ma. 2009).
455. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Legislative Tracking System, available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/186history/h00094.htm (last visited November 16, 2009).
456. A.B. 8497 (Ny. 2009); S.B. 5422 (Ny. 2009).
457. New York State Assembly, Bill Search Results, available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S05422 and
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A08497 (last visited November 16, 2009).
458. Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 447.
459. Personal knowledge of author from involvement on the committee.
460. Personal knowledge of author from involvement on the committee.
461. Personal knowledge of author from involvement on the committee.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In the main, the decisions of this Survey period clarify aspects of
arbitral law that were previously murky. The United State Supreme
Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza provides guidance to unions and
employers as to the repercussions of a union-negotiated waiver of
judicial recourse and mandatory arbitration of statutory claims. The
Supreme Court made clear that it was not overruling Gardner-Denver,4 62
though for all practical purposes, it is moving closer in that direction.
And, in more than one case, the Michigan Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in examining unique fact patterns, abided
by the historical standard of limited judicial review which circumscribes
their authority to peer into the mind of the arbitrator and ascertain the
correctness of an award. The judiciary reinforced that this is not their
mandate. When parties agree to arbitrate, they agree to accept the
arbitrator's reading of the contract, and the arbitrator's factual findings.
The one case that included a surprise element was In re Nestorovski
Estate. In concluding that an arbitrator may decide real estate interests,
the court of appeals stated that parties operating under a common law
arbitration agreement are not subject to the same strictures as those who
agree to arbitrate under the Michigan Arbitration Statute.463 Regardless
of whether one agrees with the court's ruling, the decision gives
practitioners pause when they are in litigation, and they agree, in the
interest of time or financial exigencies, to submit outstanding issues to
arbitration. The decision compels practitioners to be cautious in crafting
their arbitration agreements, to ensure that the remedy an arbitrator is
likely to impose is in keeping with party expectations.
462. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1469 n.8.
463. In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich. App. at 200, 769 N.W.2d at 734.
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